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Is There a Higher Law? Does it
Matter?
Introduction
Robert F. Cochran, Jr.*
When I was a law student at the University of Virginia in the mid-
1970s, my jurisprudence professor Calvin Woodard used the law school's
architecture to illustrate the twentieth century's major jurisprudential shift.
Above the columns at the entrance to Clark Hall, where I spent my first year
of law school, carved in stone was the statement: "That those alone may be
servants of the law who labor with learning, courage, and devotion to
preserve liberty and promote justice."'
From the front, we walked into a massive entry hall, adorned on either
side with murals. On one side was Moses presenting the Ten
Commandments to the Israelites. On the other was what appeared to be a
debate in a Greek public square. As we gazed up at the larger-than-life
figures, they seemed to represent the higher aspirations of the law. During
my second year in law school, we moved to a much more modem, efficient
building known then as "no-name hall," some distance from the rest of the
University. The statement that had been above the entrance to Clark Hall
was placed on a modest plaque at the entrance to the new building. Small
pictures of the murals were placed in the lobby. (It is my understanding that
a new addition to the law school includes copies of the statement and the
mural which split the size difference.)
Mr. Woodard (we always used "Mr." at the University of Virginia)
noted wistfully that few contemporary legal philosophers would have
thought that the aspirations for law or lawyers conveyed in the motto above
* Louis D. Brandeis Professor of Law and Director of the Herbert and Elinor Nootbaar
Institute of Law, Religion, and Ethics; J.D., University of Virginia. I would like to thank Pepperdine
Law Review's Editor in Chief, Lauren Rico, and the rest of the law review editors for their
wonderful work on this volume. They met the challenges of, and hopefully benefitted from, editing
the work of scholars from a wide variety of disciplines.
1. Kenneth Elzinga, Professor of Economics at the University of Virginia, and I independently
chose to use the Clark Hall inscription in our contributions to this symposium.
the entrance made sense any longer. Such claims were nostalgic remnants of
Blackstone's era. Legal philosophy had followed Oliver Wendell Holmes,
who defined law as merely "prophesies of what the courts will do in fact"2
and said, "I hate justice, which means that I know that if a man begins to talk
about that, for one reason or another he is shirking thinking in legal terms." 3
Holmes argued that there is no higher law. Law is merely the assertion of
power down here. Despite changing views of law, I don't believe that any
law school has chosen to place Justice Holmes's "I hate justice" statement
above its entryway.
The twentieth century did witness a few memorable higher law
assertions, including the Nuremberg Trials and Martin Luther King, Jr.'s
"Letter From a Birmingham Jail" (quoting Augustine, "An unjust law is no
law at all"). 4  But in general, American legal theorists have followed
Holmes, with the Critical Legal Studies movement claiming that law is
merely power and the Law and Economics movement claiming that good
law is merely a matter of efficiency.5 Both movements advanced very
limited views of law. The Critical Legal Studies movement undercut its own
prophetic stance and ultimately provided no basis for challenging the power
of the powerful. The Law and Economics movement provided no basis for
questioning the suffering of those who are inefficient. Neither legal theory
provides a basis for arguing that the strong should not exercise power over
the weak. Holmes-like skepticism leads ultimately to each person's
protection of his own interests. There is nothing to which a prophet can
appeal.
But higher law theories have their own problems. A higher law theory
can be the basis on which the powerful assert their power. Natural law
theory, the most widely shared higher law theory, can rigidify and merely
support the status quo.6 There is a danger that practices that are common at
2. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 461 (1897).
3. ALBERT W. ALSCHULER, LAW WITHOUT VALUES: THE LIFE, WORK, AND LEGACY OF
JUSTICE HOLMES 89 (2000).
4. AFRICAN INTELLECTUAL HERITAGE: A BOOK OF SOURCES 743 (Molefi Kete Asante & Abu
S. Abarry eds., 1996); see THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO CHRISTIAN ETHICS 92 (Robin Gill ed.,
2001) (discussing the "practical force of natural law" seen in the Nuremburg trials and Dr. King's
letter).
5. See generally Sanford Levinson, Strolling Down the Path of the Law (and Toward Critical
Legal Studies?): The Jurisprudence of Richard Posner, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1221 (1991) (reviewing
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE (1990)); MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION
UNDER LAWYERS: HOW THE CRISIS IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION IS TRANSFORMING AMERICAN
SOCIETY (1995); ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION (1993)). Some twentieth century legal theorists challenged the notion that law is
merely power. LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (rev. ed. 1977) (1969); JOHN FINNIS,
NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (H.L.A. Hart ed., 1980). In addition, as Stephen Smith has
noted, in spite of all of the talk of law as merely power and efficiency, lawyers and law professors go
on searching for "the law." STEVEN D. SMITH, LAW'S QUANDARY 39-65 (2004).
6. See, e.g., Ali Kahn, The Dignity of Labor, 32 COLUM. HuM. RTS. L. REV. 289, 338 n.205
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a time and place, like slavery and gender roles, will get the unreflective
stamp of some natural law proponents. But natural law also provides one of
the few bases for challenging the status quo-observe the witness of Martin
Luther King. Natural law points to a higher law, one that can correct
existing law.
This symposium brings together people from the fields of law, history,
economics, theology, and philosophy to address whether there is a higher
law, whether it matters, and the numerous other questions that flow from
these questions. The ordering of the essays in this symposium is not based
on some higher law. It could have been done in many different ways. We
divided the essays into historic, modem, theological, and philosophical
sections, though almost every speaker made historic, theological, and
philosophical claims about the subject.7 Here is a brief overview of the
symposium essays.
Stephen Smith provides a preface to the symposium.8 Most of the
symposium authors read Smith's Law's Quandary, a ground-breaking work
on the current status of higher law theory, and many authors address his
arguments. In the symposium preface, he argues that, though twentieth
century legal theory generally rejected the notion that there is a higher law,
law practice generally has continued to presuppose its existence. If sixteenth
century British lawyer and legal scholar Christopher St. Germain were to
return, he would find the work of lawyers to be surprisingly familiar. Smith,
in dialogue with St. Germain, explores several questions: Without a higher
law, what is the authority of law? Without a higher law, how are we to
evaluate whether a law is just? Without a higher law, how are we to
determine the meaning of a text when the text is unclear? Ordinary lawyers
and judges avoid these problems because in the practice of law, they assume
the existence of a higher law. Modem law practice, like classic legal theory,
assumes that "when we human beings make and interpret and apply law, we
(2001) (alleging that "natural law has been invoked to entrench the status quo, old traditions, and
prejudicial beliefs"); see also JEREMY BENTHAM, A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT AND AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 4 (Wilfrid Harrison ed., 1967)
(describing the "grand and fundamental" defect of Blackstone's Commentaries as "the antipathy to
reformation").
7. Whether to put Elizabeth Mensch's essay in Part II or Part Ill was an especially hard call.
Her essay compares Critical Legal Studies and Augustinian answers to the problem of
indeterminancy and serves as a nice transition between the CLS and theology essays.
8. Steven D. Smith, Higher Law Questions: A Prelude to the Symposium, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 463
(2009) [hereinafter Smith, Higher Law Questions].
are in a sense joining in a sort of cooperative venture with an intrinsically
normative cosmos." 9
I. HISTORIC PROPONENTS AND CRITICS OF THE HIGHER LAW: AQUINAS,
BLACKSTONE, AND HOLMES
Part I traces the arguments for and against the notion of a higher law
from Aquinas through Holmes. Patrick Brennan introduces us to Thomas
Aquinas by giving us Aquinas's answer to the question whether law is
merely, as Holmes argued, "prophecies of what the courts will do in fact."'
According to Aquinas, human law is derived from the natural law, which is
man's sharing in the eternal law. Anything else is not real law. Eternal law
is "in the divine mind, promulgated from eternity and for the common good
of the universe."" Humans participate in-have a share in-the eternal law
through the natural law--"a natural inclination to [humans'] proper act and
end."12 Through the natural law, God leads humans to what is good for
them, including life in social relations. Social relations in turn require
human law-law made by humans for the common good.
Albert Alschuler shows us how the natural law was reflected in William
Blackstone's Commentaries, the legal Bible for eighteenth and nineteenth
century English and American lawyers, and traces Holmes's revolt against
natural law. 13 Blackstone taught that "[t]he study of God and the study of
human nature led to the same understanding [of natural law]"--"You can
discover natural law by reading your Bible... [or] by asking whether an
action tends to man's real happiness .... Natural law places some limits
on the positive law, but as to most points humans are left at liberty in
crafting the positive law. 15  Blackstone recognized that people have a
tendency to "mistake for nature what we find established by long and
inveterate custom" and argued that the law maker should resist that
tendency. 16 Viewed properly, natural law can be a vehicle for reform.
9. Id. at 473.
10. Holmes, supra note 2, at 460-61.
11. Patrick McKinley Brennan, Persons, Participating, and "Higher Law," 36 PEPP. L. REV.
475,482 (2009) (citing SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, q. 91, art. I (Fathers of the
English Dominican Province trans., Benzinger Bros. 1947)).
12. Id. (citing AQUINAS, supra note 11, at q. 91, art. 2).
13. Albert W. Alschuler, From Blackstone to Holmes: The Revolt Against Natural Law, 36 PEPP.
L. REV. 491 (2009) [hereinafter Alschuler, From Blackstone to Holmes].
14. Id. at493.
15. 1 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE TO
THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 42 (St. George Tucker ed., The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. 1996)
(1803) (internal footnote omitted).
16. Alschuler, From Blackstone to Holmes, supra note 13, at 494 (quoting WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES * 11).
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According to Alschuler, Holmes and his twentieth century followers
generated a legal revolution by removing from the traditional conception of
law "the idea that, even as law adapts to changing circumstances, it can
adhere at its core to immutable principles of justice."17  Without such
principles, Holmes identified his "starting point for an ideal for law" as
"taking in hand life and trying to build a race," 18 "restricting propagation by
the undesirables and putting to death infants that didn't pass the
examination, etc. etc."1 9  Holmes did not leave such arguments at a
theoretical level. In Buck v. Bell, he approved of Virginia's forced
sterilization of Carrie Buck, on the grounds that "[t]hree generations of
imbeciles are enough."20
II. LAW AND ECONOMICS, CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES, AND THE HIGHER
LAW
From our look at historic views of higher law, we jump to the Law and
Economics and the Critical Legal Studies (CLS) movements of the last
quarter of the twentieth century. This section includes scholars identified
with both of these opposing wings of legal scholarship.2 1 Kenneth Elzinga,
one of the foremost Law and Economics and antitrust scholars,22 challenges
Law and Economics' focus on efficiency at the expense of the higher law's
17. Id. at 497.
18. Id. at 502 (quoting Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Ideals and Doubts, 10 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 4
(1915), reprinted in 3 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JUSTICE HOLMES: COMPLETE PUBLIC WRITINGS
AND SELECTED JUDICIAL OPINIONS OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES 443 (Sheldon M. Novick ed.,
1995)).
19. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Felix Frankfurter (Sept. 3, 1921), in HOLMES AND
FRANKFURTER: THEIR CORRESPONDENCE, 1912-1934 125 (Robert M. Mennel & Christine L.
Compston eds., 1996).
20. 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927).
21. As the moderator of this symposium's panel on which this section is based, I noted an initial
tension in the air (a tension that academic conference organizers crave). But at the conclusion of the
presentations, the panel (Kenneth Elzinga, Peter Gabel, and Elizabeth Mensch) seemed ready for a
chorus of "Kumbaya." (John Schlegel's response to Peter Gabel was added after the conference;
Elizabeth Mensch's piece appears at the beginning of Part llI).
22. See, e.g., Kenneth G. Elzinga & Thomas F. Hogarty, Utah Pie and the Consequences of
Robinson-Patman, 21 J.L. & ECON. 427 (1978); Kenneth Elzinga & William Breit, Antitrust
Enforcement and Economic Efficiency: The Uneasy Case for Treble Damages, 17 J.L. & ECON. 329
(1974); Kenneth G. Elzinga & William Breit, Attitudes Toward Risk and Antitrust Penalties, 85
HARV. L. REV. 693 (1973); Kenneth G. Elzinga, Predatory Pricing: The Case of the Gunpowder
Trust, 13 J.L. & ECON. 223 (1970); Kenneth G. Elzinga, The Antimerger Law: Pyrrhic Victories?, 12
J.L. & ECON. 43 (1969) (cited by Justice Steward in Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562,
582 (1972)).
concern for justice and mercy.2 3 He notes that Law and Economics scholar
and judge Richard Posner argues that rape, murder, and theft should be
punished, not because they violate some moral law, but because they are
inefficient. Elzinga's challenge comes from Christian and Jewish scripture
("140 entries for justice; zero for efficiency").24 He quotes the prophet
Micah: "'[The Lord requires you] to act justly and to love mercy and to walk
humbly with your God.' 25 Micah does not add, 'Oh, and strive for Pareto-
optimality in the process.' ' 26
Peter Gabel was one of the founders of the Critical Legal Studies
movement and retains close ties to it.27 Nevertheless, in his essay, he takes
on one of the hallmarks of CLS, the argument that law is indeterminate. 28
"[T]he proponents of the indeterminacy critique managed to make
themselves unable to offer any 'basis' for their own passionately held moral
starting point, declaring that these motivating convictions were 'irrational'
and outside the realm of rational knowledge. ,29 While Gabel
acknowledges that an appeal to "moral longing has been the basis for terrible
injustice and suffering," he calls for CLS to "return to its original instincts as
a righteous social transformation movement" rooted in love for other human
beings and for "a new legal culture that would strengthen and help to realize
the loving bond between us; the bond that actually unites us as social
beings."3 °
Though Gabel's fellow CLS founder John Schlegel was not at our
original conference, he found Gabel's symposium essay sufficiently
stimulating that he provided a response.3" Schlegel acknowledges that some
have left CLS because of its failure to identify a firm ground for its critique.
Some broke off--"the fem-crits and the race-crits"-grounding their critique
in the reality of personal experience. 32 Schlegel identifies several who are
attempting to resuscitate CLS, of whom he finds Gabel's attempt to find
"rootedness ... in unalienated social relations" the most interesting.33
However, Schlegel is skeptical that law can do much to encourage our unity
23. See Kenneth G. Elzinga, Law and Economics: Is there a Higher Law?, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 507
(2009) [hereinafter Elzinga, Law and Economics].
24. Id. at 509.
25. Micah 6:8 (New International Version).
26. Elzinga, Law and Economics, supra note 23 at 510.
27. My initial emails to Gabel and CLS co-founder Duncan Kennedy inviting them to participate
in this symposium were answered by both Gabel and Kennedy from Kennedy's home where they
had gathered for a reunion (Gabel accepted my invitation, Kennedy declined).
28. See Peter Gabel, Critical Legal Studies as a Spiritual Practice, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 515 (2009).
29. Id. at 521.
30. Id. at 529.
31. See John Henry Schlegel, For Peter, With Love, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 535 (2009).
32. Id. at 537.
33. See id. at 539.
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as social beings. He suggests that humans and law can get along pretty well
without any grounding and notes that an Augustinian Christian would
recognize that this might be "all that humans have available to them after
The Fall.",34 Schlegel argues: "The patient, necessarily self-critical humility
of arguments made from such a position has a certain attractiveness to me,
situated as I am today among the wildly overblown claims of warring
political factions acting as if saying things over and over, ever louder, makes
them more likely to be true."35
III. THEOLOGY AND THE HIGHER LAW
Our third section explores theological critiques of the higher law. The
essay by Patrick Brennan at the beginning of Part One of this symposium
presented the higher law framework of Thomas Aquinas which has been
followed by the Catholic Church. As the first three essays in this section
indicate, other theologians have been more ambivalent about human law
reflecting a higher law.
Elizabeth Mensch explores Augustine's ambivalence about human
law. 36 "While many did strive to find continuity between human law and
the law of God during [the classical period of the high middle ages], a long
and vibrant Christian tradition [represented by Augustine] instead stresses
rupture and discontinuity."37  Augustine affirmed "the tragic necessity of
legal coercion" though the most that we can generally hope for from it is
peace.38 He located messianic justice in the City of God, not in the City of
Man. As both Augustine and the Critical Legal Studies movement have
argued, law is "much more contingent, more provisional, more self-
contradictory, and much more human than it ha[s] been made out to be."'3 9
Ellen Pryor40 considers Catholic and Lutheran views of law in the
context of a story of her early law practice. As she shows, Catholic and
34. Id. For further discussion of both CLS and Augustine, see Elizabeth Mensch's essay at the
beginning of the next section. See infra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
35. Schlegel, supra note 31, at 539.
36. See Elizabeth Mensch, Cain's Law, 36 PEPP. L. REv. 541 (2009).
37. Id. at 541.
38. See id. at 543.
39. Id. at 545.
40. Professor Pryor was not a participant in this Higher Law Symposium. A few months after
that conference, however, she gave the lecture on which her essay herein is based, the Pepperdine
University School of Law Herb and Elinor Nootbaar Institute on Law, Religion and Ethics, Louis
Brandeis Lecture: "Hungering for Righteousness: What Can a Lawyer Believe About, and Hope
From, Law?" (Apr. 11, 2008).
Thomist natural law theory is likely to create high expectations for law from
those who enter the legal profession, expectations that human law will
follow reason and the Eternal law of God.41 Aquinas taught that "the proper
effect of law is to make those to whom it is given, good. 4 2 Is law worthy of
those expectations? How should a young lawyer react if those expectations
are crushed? Pryor contrasts the optimistic Catholic natural law view with
the more pessimistic Lutheran nature/grace dichotomy: "[The natural law
viewpoint] leads me to false optimism about my own ability to discern what
the just or right result is."' 43 Pryor leaves us with a call to "an intentional
hope that rejects both certainty and despair about what law can do in this
world.",
44
Joan Lockwood O'Donovan, coming from an Anglican perspective, sees
an important, yet tragic and limited role for law and political judgment.45
Human law is God's "providential condemnation of human wrongdoing
which mercifully preserves the common life of sinful human beings against
the assault of human evil."46  She contrasts law's limited role with "the
promised renewal of created human freedom through the church's practice
of proclamation., 47 O'Donovan applauds English criminal law, which "has
conformed to the longstanding theological conviction that political judgment
should not attempt to prescribe, nor aspire to effect, godly, righteous,
virtuous, and just conduct, but to proscribe only those graver violations of
the moral law that threaten the precarious society of sinful human beings. 48
A tendency to legal perfectionism encroaches on both "the impaired and
fragmentary freedom still available to sinful human beings" and the
opportunity for repentance and faith made available through the church's
proclamation.49 Without a "recognition of the moral deficiencies of political
judgment, judges' practices are bound to succumb to the vices of cynicism,
greed, and a lust for power, concealed by a theoretical self-deception that
endows the ongoing practice of judgment with more integrity than it actually
has." 50
In a previous work, William Brewbaker criticized the notion, held by
some proponents of a higher law, that judges should "find" law and not
41. See Ellen S. Pryor, Wat Can We Hope from Law?, 36 PEPP. L. REv. 547 (2009).
42. ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, q. 91, art. 1, reprinted in ST. THOMAS
AQUINAS, TREATISE ON LAW, at 13 (Gateway ed., 8th prtg. 1970).
43. Pryor, supra note 41, at 562.
44. Id. at 572.
45. See Joan Lockwood O'Donovan, Law and Redemption: Political Judgment and the Church's
Proclamation, 36 PEPP. L. REv. 573 (2009).
46. Id. at 575.
47. Id. at 576.
48. See id. at 577.
49. See id.
50. Id. at 578-79.
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"make" it. 5' Brewbaker argued that this notion denigrates the appropriate
and godly role of creativity on the part of judges and legislators.5 2 Judges, at
their best, join with God in developing law." In his essay in this collection,
Brewbaker draws insights from Dorothy Sayers's The Mind of the Maker on
the role that judges play in making law. 4 As Aquinas argued, we see only
the "' first principles of natural law'-that are naturally known (more or less)
to all human beings and are (more or less) the same for all" and judges and
legislators must make "particular determinations., 55 But the creativity of
judges and legislators has its limits. When laws ignore "the fundamental
realities of human nature, they will end by producing.., such catastrophes
as war, pestilence and famine."'5 6 At its best, law will fall short--"the line
between good and evil runs through the heart of each human being and, by
extension, each political society.
5 7
Many higher law theories are theological in nature. As we have seen,
Aquinas argues that the positive law should be based on the natural law and
that the natural law is drawn from God's eternal law. But many natural law
proponents, including John Finnis, the leader of the modem revival of
natural law, argue that natural law is discernable through reason alone. 58
Yitzchock Adlerstein, in his contribution to this collection, argues that we
need divine revelation to discern the higher law." "Absent [religious] faith,
our present view of reason as tentative and elastic precludes any workable
higher law system of more than academic interest. ' 60 Rabbi Adlerstein,
quoting Protestant theologian Paul Tillich, suggests that Kant's non-
theological ethics provided the moral wiggle room that led to the Holocaust.
Adlerstein argues from the Talmud, Maimonides, and Rabbi Yaakov Emden
that "there is no wisdom in any humanly arrived-at moral system, because
51. See William S. Brewbaker III, Found Law, Made Law and Creation: Reconsidering
Blackstone's Declaratory Theory, 22 J.L. & RELIGION 255, 278-80 (2007).
52. See id.
53. See id. at 279-80.
54. William S. Brewbaker III, Law, Higher Law, and Human Making, 36 PEPP. L. REv. 581
(2009).
55. Id. at 588 (quoting ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA Theologica pt. I-II, q. 94, art. 4)
(Benzinger Bros. eds., Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., 1947).
56. Id. at 591 (quoting DOROTHY SAYERS, THE MIND OF THE MAKER, at 23 (1956)).
57. Id.at60I.
58. JOHN FNNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1980).
59. Yitzchok Adlerstein, Theology and Higher Law, 36 PEPP. L. REv. 603 (2009).
60. Id. at 606.
there is some counter argument for every moral argument that can ever be
made!"
6
'
IV. PHILOSOPHY AND THE HIGHER LAW
Connie Rosati does what philosophers often do. They force us to clarify
our questions and answers. She notes the ambiguities in our symposium's
title: "Is There a Higher Law? Does it Matter?" 62 The title raises three
separate questions. First, is moral realism true, i.e., are there moral facts that
are accessible to us? As a sub-question to this, she addresses whether moral
truths necessarily have their source in God, a question related to the question
Rabbi Adlerstein addresses in the prior essay. Rosati argues, contra
Adlerstein, that it is "a mistake to think that the existence of moral truths,
and so the existence of a higher law, has any crucial connection with God. '63
Second, assuming there is a moral reality, is it a necessary condition on a
law that it comport with that reality? If so, "[t]he efforts of judges to follow
the law in deciding cases will require that they attend not only to precedent
and legislatively enacted rules but also to the requirements of morality." 64
Finally, are there "legal facts that are in some measure independent of the
decisions of judges"? The "higher law" might merely be "whatever the law
truly requires, forbids, or permits" whether judges get it right or not. Rosati
notes that the notion of the rule of law presumes the objectivity of law. "If
the law was just whatever judges decided, then judges themselves would
not-indeed, could not-be following the law in reaching their
decisions ...,65
Bradley Lewis picks up where Rosati leaves off, with consideration of
the rule of law. Lewis explores Plato's answer to the question whether the
rule of law (an "open, clear, coherent, prospective, and stable" set of rules 66)
is consistent with the rule of reason grounded in virtue ethics. Whereas
under the rule of reason, wise, virtuous judges would provide an individual
assessment of one's actions in each circumstance, the rule of law requires
that law be established beforehand and applicable consistently to all. "For
the classics, the ideal is the rule of reason or intelligence, and the rule of law
is a kind of necessary compromise of that.",67  On the other hand, law's
rigidity and universality "allow people to form stable plans and
61. See id. at 608.
62. Connie S. Rosati, Is There a "Higher Law? " Does It Matter?, 36 PEPP. L. REv. 615 (2009).
63. Seeid. at619.
64. See id. at 625.
65. Id. at 628.
66. V. Bradley Lewis, Higher Law and the Rule of Law: The Platonic Origin of an Ideal, 36
PEPP. L. REv. 631,631 (2009).
67. Lewis, supra note 66, at 633.
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expectations. ' 68 This exposes "a tension rooted in human nature between
man's rational and political capacities., 69  Lewis, with Plato, explores
various ways to manage the tension. Echoing a point developed in William
Brewbaker's essay herein, Lewis argues that "law is a product of human
art. ' 70 Lewis concludes by tracing this issue from Plato through Aristotle to
Aquinas, noting that Aquinas roots the rule of law in the higher law, arguing
that "laws are the necessary basis but that individuals can be dispensed from
them in cases where the common good would be better served."'"
Dallas Willard,7 2 in the final symposium essay, notes that the existence
of an appeals system acknowledges that law (at least as determined by trial
judges) stands under judgment. "But there are distortions [in individual
cases] that no appeals system can correct. Sometimes what comes out of
due process is simply wrong and unjust."' 73 A higher law is needed, both to
assess the outcome of legal processes in individual cases and to assess the
possible need for changes in the law through legislation. "To say there is no
higher law really means that there can be no issue as to what is morally right
with regard to the conduct and outcome of legal procedures. That surely
undermines the confidence in law that is essential to its use and essential to
the health and stability of a society and human existence based upon 
law. 7 4
At the end of the day, many questions are left on the table. The most
challenging may be, if there is a higher law and it is to serve as a guide for
the positive law, how do we find it and what are its contents? Those are
questions for many more conferences and symposia.
68. See id. at 638.
69. See id. at 638-39.
70. See id. at 637.
71. See id. at 660 (citing ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA lallae at q. 96, art. 6; cf
id. at q. 97, art. 7).
72. Dallas Willard, Why It Matters Whether There Is a Higher Law or Not, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 661
(2009).
73. Id. at 663.
74. Id. at 664.

